Articles

 

Could swapping carbon emissions rather than trading them reduce climate change?

 

Australian researchers have suggested that nations should abandon the concept of carbon emissions trading in favour of a carbon swap bank that might lead to genuine reductions in the amount of carbon dioxide greenhouse gas entering the atmosphere and so provide a mechanism for reducing climate change. Details of the carbon swap bank are outlined in the journal Interdisciplinary Environmental Review. (Please note that the Inderscience Publication Catalogue is available to view and download at: www.inderscience.com/CATALOGUE. Please circulate the information to your library and others who may be interested. Hard copies of the catalogues are also available on request from: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it ).   

Carbon emissions trading was to be the economic environmental solution to climate change. The original impetus of the Copenhagen Treaty in 2010 was to mitigate rising global average temperature by allowing nations that reduced their carbon emissions to trade with other nations and so motivate all nations to find ways of cutting pollution.

The idea for an emission trading scheme first emerged in the 1960s in the USA. "Cap and trade" was essentially an invention of economists, and in particular, Canadian economist JH Dales in 1968. The first such cap-and-trade system was launched as part of the US Acid Rain Program in Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act but similar schemes have been mooted in the face of global warming. Emissions trading became part of the Kyoto Protocol through the efforts of the Clinton Administration. Its success in reducing sulfur dioxide emissions and so reducing acid rain was seen as successful and inexpensive. The international adoption of cap-and-trade followed from the notion that,

"We've found an effective tool, domestically, for controlling emissions, and let's try it internationally." Unfortunately, economic solutions to scientific and engineering problems rarely succeed especially once politicians become involved. Various proposed bills in the USA and Australia faltered because of agricultural issues and a failure to force those industries that produce the greatest tonnage of carbon dioxide pollution to alter their technologies. Moreover, carbon trading became nothing more than a financial vehicle with excessive derivatives, an uncontrolled offset market, and distortion of permits and taxes. 

According to Dr. Carolyn Currie of Public Private Sector Partnerships, in Sydney, Australia, a carbon swap bank would allow direct deposits of sequestered carbon to be added and withdrawals of emission rights to be made. The process would not work like an investment futures market but would be facilitated by direct swap arrangements between a supplier of carbon sequestering technologies and methods, and those of the carbon polluter. This approach gets around some of the major obstacles to carbon trading, namely the accurate measurement of a nation's emissions and the regulation and enforcement of emissions controls internationally. More troublesome is the fact that emissions trading is not incentive compatible and so can result in perverse incentives whereby a polluting firm given emission permits has no incentive to reduce emissions further because future emissions permits might then be restricted. Similarly, regions, such as the European Union, could protect the industries within member states by allocating permits to reduce international competition from outside such a region. 

There are five main advantages to a carbon swap bank over other carbon emission controls, according to Currie: 

1  the macroeconomic significance of avoiding the free market flaws of volatility in price 

2  mitigation of the uncertainty that an emissions trading scheme will actually induce significant changes in technology 

3  the likelihood that changes will not be confined to the domestic economies of developed nations 

4  the cost of a permit may be significantly higher than carbon swap arrangements when corruption of the permit process and the profiteering evident in the EU are taken into account 

5  changes towards sequestration and emissions reduction can be identified and monitored and progress to lower carbon cap nationally assessed by listing all specific projects aimed to sequester carbon and reduce emissions. 

While developed nations are now baulking at the implementation of carbon emissions trading schemes, a government could easily experiment with a carbon swap bank to benefit, for instance, its forestry and agricultural sectors, while reducing its emissions, based on the concept of increasing productivity in the sequestering sector, while preserving non-renewable resources for future generations; no international agreements would be needed and there would be no detrimental effect on national industry or competitiveness, and no potential for financial wizards to embroil carbon emissions in their vicious circle of boom and bust, concludes Currie.  

"A solution to climate change economics – a carbon swap bank" in Interdisciplinary Environmental Review, 2010, 11, 236-247.  

Please contact the corresponding author, Carolyn Currie, by email on This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it for further information about the research.  

Reporters may request a PDF copy of the full paper from Albert Ang at Inderscience Publishers on This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it   

   

An empirical test of a new theory of economic reform using Indonesia as a case study 1988 to 2005

Abstract

Debate regarding key factors determining the success or failure of policies of liberalization and privatization, illustrates the need for a concise theoretical foundation to guide decision makers as to how, when, and where to apply policies that change underlying economic structures.  Theories of economic growth have failed to identify key factors underlying economic growth, as well as develop adequate yardsticks of development. Moreover often economic growth is taken as a measure of success without considering the underlying social development and distribution of wealth. A new theory is expounded herein and tested using Indonesian time series data. The results of the empirical tests of this theory reported herein add another dimension to the debate on emerging markets. One factor appears vital to the success of such policies. This is the education level of females. It is the only factor that appears consistently correlated with successful achievement of reform packages, measured by two new criterion of economic and social development.

 



1.    Aims and objectives.

This research has one purpose - to conduct an empirical test of a new theory of Economic Reform.  The reason for  using Indonesia as a case study is due to its suitability as a country going through a reform process after a period of financial crises and regulatory failure. 

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening up of Communist nations, economists have promoted new ownership structures as a solution to the maximization of welfare and a way of introducing market forces into command economies.  They have advocated privatization in particular as the optimal means of achieving an increase in economic growth and lifting per capital income.  Privatization is not the only means of reducing state ownership and control of enterprises. Economists have also touted public private partnerships and private finance initiatives as means of promoting economic and social development.  However, regulators are still intensely debating whether privatization and other ownership structures, which are not totally dependent on state ownership and control, achieve such goals or in fact cause a deterioration in welfare levels from those existing under a command economy.  For instance Stiglitz (2002)  claimed that the IMF advocated such policies without considering factors vital to the suitability of such reform programs to a particular economy and society.  Reformists did not understand the particular history, the social capital, the political institutions, and how political forces affected political processes (Stiglitz, 1999, p.4) .  Academics and other advisers have refuted Stiglitz’s trenchant criticism of development strategies, which rely largely on changing ownership structures, claiming success for such policies in China and Poland (Dabrowski, Gomulka and Rostowski, 2001) .  Dabrowski et al (2001) point out that Stiglitz ignores the principal reasons for failure of these policies in Russia, and fails to distinguish why these policies succeeded elsewhere.

The arguments of these authors (Dabrowski et al, 2001) illustrate some important flaws in contemporary thinking regarding the measurement and assessment of development yardsticks, which have implications for advocacy of an ‘optimal’ model for reforming and restructuring an economy.  They advocate policies to achieve success in reform by concentrating on improving the institutional, legal, and economic conditions for rapid and sustainable growth.  Hence success should be measured by the increase in output deriving from the private sector from the start of recovery, (Dabrowski et al, 2001, p.297), and not by the overall growth of GNP of the whole economy, as suggested by Stiglitz, as this indicator can be affected during transition by pre-reform crisis conditions.  Dabrowski et al (2001) advocate a principle where loss making State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) should be shutdown and not privatized, and the rapid expansion of a new private sector encouraged instead.  The welfare costs associated with discontinuing and not privatising SOEs can be regarded as an investment “needed to achieve permanent welfare gains from the better allocation of labour and other resources in the future” (Dabrowski et al, 2001, p.298).

This research attempts to take the arguments of both Stiglitz et al (2001) and Dabrowski et al (2001) and test my own formulation of a new theory of economic reform. This will aid in understanding the principal factors that can constitute barriers to the success of economic reform strategies, which rely on new ownership structures to promote efficiency, and thus raise the production frontier of an economy.
 
2. A new theory of Economic Reform

Debate regarding key factors determining the success or failure of policies of liberalization and privatization, illustrates the need for a concise theoretical foundation to guide decision makers as to how, when, and where to apply policies that change underlying economic structures.  Below I outline such a framework, which is based on the perception of gradations in the process of development.  It also argues that the introduction of new ownership structures, market mechanisms, and financing techniques are not necessarily solutions without providing for changes in economic, societal, and legal infrastructures.

The new theory of choice of ownership structures espoused in this paper, thus conceives of a national economy as set of interrelating systems and subsystems.  Hence the method of liberalising an industry through changing ownership structures can be described in terms of a matrix, (see Table 1), and a set of equations.  This in turn dictates a staged approach to changing ownership structures.

In this theory Economic development (Y1) is defined as sustainable growth.  This can be measured at the level of the individual by the increase in a maintainable and stable level of income per capita, and at the corporate or institutional level by the increase in maintainable and stable accumulated earnings per capita.  At the country level, improvements in the ratio of external debt and current account balance to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as well as increases in the level of maintainable and stable GDP per capita, are appropriate measures of success.  These definitions avoid the criticism of using inappropriate yardsticks of growth of GDP, as in transition economies, growth may initially be negative as pre-reform crisis conditions impact immediately after reform.  This was one of the areas of disagreement between Dabrowski et al, (2001) and Stiglitz (1998a,b, 2001) .  Also a policy may appear to successful in the short term using growth in GDP as a yardstick, but it is the maintenance of income per capita, corporate profitability and an increasing debt servicing ability at the national level over a long term that is the best criteria of success.

Social development (Y2) is defined as growth in the equitable distribution of wealth, which can be measured by the dispersion and distribution of per capita income, and participation in institutions.  A scale ranking the capacity to participate in the institutional framework of government may be a useful adjunct to wealth distribution measures.  However, active participation is in turn is a function of improving the quality of human capital, in terms of education, knowledge and skills, which are vital to social and economic dev. This is likely to provide development strategies that adjust policies regarding ownership structures to the underlying fundamental differences between economies.

Table 1: Factors in the Choice of Type, Timing and Method of Valuation of Ownership Structures

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Ownership of Capital - proportion of direct and indirect ownership by individuals vs. institutional/elite vs. State   (O)

Type of Ownership Structure, Methods of Valuation and Timing

(T)
Stage of Social Development(Y2)

Regulatory Structure (M)

and Industry Structure (C) 
Stage of Managerial Expertise, Organizational Structure and Processes (E)
Stage of Economic Development (Y1) Compliance or stage of legal infrastructure development (L)

Political System (P) which influences Government Goals (G) and which influences the allocation of Economic Resources  (R)


The type of government will influence government goals (G) and in turn will determine the allocation of resources. The optimum set of government goals, are derived from theories of financial regulation (Sinkey, 1992) .  These theories emphasise the pre-eminence of safety of depositors in financial institutions, currency and price stability, industry structures that promote competition, convenience of users of financial services (such as access to a product or service)  and general public confidence in the financial system.  Such goals are considered necessary to promote a market economy.  However, how a government allocates its economic resources can determine whether such goals are achievable.  An economy can expand its resource allocation through spending more than it raises is revenue, assisted by direct foreign investment, borrowings, and aid.  Hence, government goals can be expressed as,

 

  G = f (S, S, S, C, C) = f (R) = f (D, FDI, K, A)                                   (1)

Where safety (S), stability (S), structure (S), convenience (C) and confidence (C) are a function of how economic resources (R) are allocated and may require deficit spending (D), direct foreign investment (FDI), private capital formation and borrowings, (K) and foreign aid (A) .
The optimum mix of direct and indirect public ownership, where the latter is defined by ownership by pension or mutual funds or employee share ownership plans, can be seen as dependent on simultaneous design of the regulatory model and the industry structure, as well as the stage of development of the legal infrastructure. The first two factors of M and C will both influence, and be dependent on, the stage of social development more than L, which has a closer tie to the stage of economic development. This could be expressed as,

The Optimum Ownership Mix or O = M.C (Y2). L (Y1)                (2)

The type of ownership structure, whether a PPP, PFI or a privatization, as well as the timing and valuation method is influenced by the E factor – the stage of managerial expertise, organizational structure and processes – as well as by the P factor. The E factor influences and is dependent on social development while the political system, the P factor, has a closer relationship with the stage of economic development. Another way of expressing this is,

The Optimum Type of Ownership Structure or T= E (Y2). P (Y1)                      (3)

It is postulated that in the above model Social Development, or Y2, may decrease then increase as M, C and E change. This is due to the initial effects of deregulation of protective measures on an industry, and the time lag before learning effects of change kick in and prudential supervision increases in strength to compensate for the reduction in protective measures. The resulting increase in social development may be at a decreasing rate as decreasing returns to scale of M and C are experienced, as the regulatory model and market structure may become burdensome, clogged and lead to obstacles. This requires input from factors affecting economic development.

The political and legal systems must allow feedback so that as social development occurs, more reliance can be made on self-regulatory market mechanisms. Hence the regulatory model and performance of the market structure will require continual monitoring. Development of the E factor will contribute to more effective prudential supervision through enhanced skill levels both within the regulator, the marketplace and the entities subject to changed ownership.

Economic Development or Y1 may increase at a decreasing rate as efficiencies are realized or could display a Cobb Douglas pattern  due to the political system not adapting quickly to sectoral imbalances, particularly in the supply of human capital. Alternatively, it could be due to the failure to adjust the legal infrastructure as the quality of human capital increases, which is a sequencing problem.  If economic development is uneven, this could promote political instability, which in turn affects resource allocation.  This would be most evident in failure to assess and adjust social development policies according to our allocated priorities of M, C, and E.

The implications of this theory, or choice matrix, are that it is vital to assess the stage of P, E, L, M and C – the political system, human capital, legal infrastructure and the regulatory models governing the financial system and industry - before choosing the ownership structure as well as timing and valuation methods and,

  • That the design of M, the regulatory model governing the financial system, is a starting point which must take account of the type of existing, and desired market structure, i.e. C, as well as the caliber of E;
  • That if all of the factors are weak at the starting point of economic reform, a careful staged approach should be used. Only a formal deregulation and program of ownership change should be considered. This will involve continual monitoring both by the government undertaking the change, and by external aid agencies such as the IMF and World Bank. Otherwise an entrenched elite will take the place of the state in ownership and control, without the requisite spread of the advantages of moving an economy to a full free market basis.


 

PFI figure
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The interaction of the variables of P, E, L, M and C is multidimensional, but an attempt is made in Figure 1 to illustrate how an economist could diagnose an economy, and prescribe ownership mechanisms as well as necessary reform of factors to promote economic and social development. The purpose of Figure I is to illustrate that a staged approach to the choice of the development of ownership structures must be the overriding principle dominating an economic reform package. For instance the left hand lower quadrant starts with state ownership and control where all factors are weak as opposed to the full market based system in the top right hand quadrant.

We can see from Figure I that where E is rated highly together with M, C, and L that a full public float with reliance on the market mechanism should promote the optimum outcome. This is what we would expect of an advanced economy with a high level of managerial expertise, organizational structure, processes, regulatory and industry structures and legal development. Or if the industry by its nature is non-contestable, such as telecommunications, a privatization can work with prudential oversight of pricing and market practices. That is the C factor must be improved.

Figure 1 also illustrates that a PFI is the ownership mechanism where all factors are rated at mid point, while a PPP is appropriate where all factors receive a low rating, except for the E factor of managerial expertise, organizational structure and processes, which needs to be injected by the private sector. Indeed this is often the rationale for involvement of the private sector. PPPs can occur in an advanced economy, where due to a long history of state involvement in a particular industry such as education, the industry is one where the regulator does not have the supervisory skills or requisite powers. Also the expertise in modern market practices within the industry may be lacking and the industry may be protected from competition by legislation. Hence it appears as a pocket of state ownership and control within a free market economy. An injection of market expertise from allied industries, which have developed private sector practices, should be sought in a consortium between SOEs and private firms.
Figure 1 hence illustrates that where the E factor is weak, while the other factors have been improved to a moderate level, changing ownership structures is not advisable until either the E factor is improved, or the other factors strengthened.

Such a staged approach requires measurement techniques to assess the state of the input factors. The taxonomy of regulatory models described elsewhere (Currie, 2000) could be used to assess the M factor, while the C factor could be assessed by a Porter style industry analysis. The E factor could be measured by the quantitative methods to assess human capital described in Section 2, while the P factor assessed by stated government goals, as well as the resources devoted to all the other factors, as revealed in the national accounts. The L factor could be assessed not just by compliance with the compendium of standards, but by studies of corruption and independence of the judiciary such as undertaken in Indonesia.

3. The need for empirical testing

he theory outlined above has canvassed some of the essential ingredients in the resolution of the debate as to the merits of changing ownership structures on economic and social development.  What is new is a theoretical framework to analyse and measure readiness of an economy for reform, as well as to analyse why past attempts failed. This allows a basis to prescribe an optimum staged approach.  Indonesia is a fertile database having suffered a severe financial crises with closure and collapse of its banking system after an attempt to privatize sectors of the economy, and now being under IMF direction to privatize as many industries as possible. Data will relate to the measurement of factors detailed in the theory with an attempt to validate hypotheses embodied in the above three equation.

Analysis of past successes and failures in Indonesia in privatizing industry during the period 1988 – 2003 is to be measured by my unique indices for economic and social development (Y1,Y2 ). The ability to empirical assess the input factors of the model, and then relate them to desired outcomes in terms of my economic and social development indices, may lead to other approaches to economic reform through changing ownership structures.  For instance, continued government involvement by requiring a percentage of future profits or gain upon resale when economic and political opinion considers privatization a fire sale solution, has not been attempted.  Neither have mechanisms to ensure employees (and customers) share in the benefits conferred by a privatized entity.

A basis for such initial research would be a classification of regulatory models in the industries in Indonesia that did and are still to undergo ownership changes as specified by the Republic of Indonesia in conjunction with the IMF, and assessment of the state of requisite inputs in terms of C, E, L, P as well as specification of G and R, government goals and resource inputs.  Monitoring of the performance of the industry and entity at a micro level (which can be attempted using measures of profitability and productivity) is essential as is attempting to statistically derive functional relationships between the input of C, E, L, P and output variables which measure success of policies, such as increases in the proportion of GDP the private sector is contributing, as well as the measures for economic and social development (Y1, Y2) as uniquely defined in my theory.

The key dependent variables of interest are changes in the ownership structure, the timing and valuation and how they relate to the independent variables as specified in equations 1,2 and 3 above. Initially multiple regression analysis will be attempted followed by use of curve fitting software to test formulations of the theory.

5. Methodology and Results

The first part of this research involved attempting to develop a new index of economic development known as @page Section1 {size: 612.0pt 792.0pt; margin: 72.0pt 90.0pt 72.0pt 90.0pt; mso-header-margin: 36.0pt; mso-footer-margin: 36.0pt; mso-paper-source: 0; } P.MsoNormal { MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt; FONT-FAMILY: "Times New Roman"; FONT-SIZE: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-style-parent: ""; mso-pagination: widow-orphan; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US } LI.MsoNormal { MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt; FONT-FAMILY: "Times New Roman"; FONT-SIZE: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-style-parent: ""; mso-pagination: widow-orphan; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US } DIV.MsoNormal { MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt; FONT-FAMILY: "Times New Roman"; FONT-SIZE: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-style-parent: ""; mso-pagination: widow-orphan; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US } DIV.Section1 { page: Section1 }  Y1. To do this we regressed growth in GDP per capita for the years 1988-2003 using data from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank against a range of variables, using ANOVA techniques.  After six rounds the best result was achieved by using the variables of gross domestic capital formation as a percentage of GDP, gross domestic saving as percentage of GDP, the current account balance as a percentage of GDP, external debt as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) and Debt Service as percentage of exports of goods and services. The results are described in Table 2.


Table 2: SUMMARY OUTPUT  (Y1 as growth in GDP per capita)

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Table 2: SUMMARY OUTPUT  (Y1 as growth in GDP per capita)
  P-value Significance
Intercept 0.00  
Gross domestic capital formation 0.03 S
Gross domestic saving 0.05 S
Current account balance 0.07 ?
External debt as % of GNI 0.00 HS
Debt service as % of exports of goods and services 0.03 S
 

 

Hence we adopted growth in GDP per capita as a measure of sustainable economic growth. We then attempted to develop a measure of social development - Y2 - by regressing two measures of social development – HDI and GINI/HDI  against a range of selected variables including the variables in Table 3 plus daily newspapers produced, immunization proxies, percentage of females in the workforce, infant mortality, land use.

Table 3: SUMMARY OUTPUT  (Y2 as GINI/HDI,)

  P-value Significance
Intercept      0.28  
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) - SS1 0.00 HS
School enrollment, tertiary, female (% gross) - SS3 0.00 HS
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) - SS4 0.10  
Maternal Mortality Ratio (per 100,000 live births) - SS5 0.34  
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) - SS6 0.27  
   

 

 

Twelve runs resulted in the percentage of the population enrolled in school and tertiary education, in particular females, having the highest correlation with measures predicting a higher index of human development adjusted for  a measure of income equality. Hence this measure - GINI/HDI - was taken as a good proxy of social development or Y2.

Given the difficulties in measuring inputs required for the first part of the matrix – that is the  determination of the optimum mix of direct and indirect ownership over the time period specified it was decided to concentrate on the third equation -

The Optimum Type of Ownership Structure or T= E (Y2). P (Y1)                      (3)

This was done by using Standards and Poor ratings system as a measure of the type of political system which combines measures of democracy with political corruption. The Corruption Index provided by the World Bank only extended back to 1995.
Curve fitting was conducted in several stages.
 
E as a function of Y2   
Data for E, education levels measured by the variable of school enrollment, as function of Y2.

The resulting equation which was the line of best fit was
y=a+blnx/x
where
y = Y2
x = E
This run produced a line of best fit with the highest R2 score, where a =16.691747, b= --24.698196.
As the dependent variable was measured by GINI/HDI the results showed that a high level of inequality was associated with a very skewed or unequal level of income and human development and was a function of very low school enrollment – as the school enrollment increased, so did our measure of social development, albeit as a decreasing rate.
 
P as a function of Y1
Data for P, a Standards and Poor measure of the political system, was fitted as a function of Y1.
The resulting equation which was the line of best fit was
y=a+b/x2
where
y = Y1
x = P
This run produced a line of best fit with the highest R2 score, where a =8.9270203, b= --506.15478.
The results showed that as the underlying economic development indicator improved so did the political system.

T as a function of E (Y2). P (Y1)
T was run as 3D function of predicted-E and predicted- P.
The resulting equation was
lnz=a+bex/wx+c/x2

where    
z = T    
x = E-predict    
y = P-predict    
This run produced a line of best fit with 91.2% accuracy (R2), where a = -12.043073, b= -853.28273 and c=2213.8574.
The results showed that Z or the optimum type of ownership structure was not a function of P but of E, with increasing returns to scale up to a certain point, then decreasing returns to scale. In other words, increasing the education level could move an economy along the scale from the weakest to the strongest form of reduced government involvement in the ownership structure.

T as a function of E_predict and P_predict.
Table 4A and B  describes the raw data  and the output for where T was run as a function of the (predicted-E x predicted-P) to see the best fit equation.
T = a + [ b ln(E.P) / (E.P) ]
was the resulting equation where
y = T
x = E.P

and a=0.42503439 and b=-2.8746624.

Table 4A: SUMMARY INPUT AND OUTPUT
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  T E Y2 P Y1
1988 0.02412 8.90480 1.53847 10.60873 17.58646
1989 0.03462 9.06480 1.56611 10.02464 17.66035
1990 0.06937 9.22480 1.59375 9.44056 15.14444
1991 0.08148 9.38050 1.41783 8.85648 16.61012
1992 0.09782 9.27860 1.25449 3.00000 11.12903
1993 0.18141 10.34510 1.27470 9.60556 14.87319
1994 0.26874 11.09600 1.29004 8.73389 14.01212
1995 0.33084 11.30790 1.41636 9.00000 16.97432
1996 0.42507 11.26970 1.41600 9.00000 15.83519
1997 0.41946 11.26870 1.41668 6.50000 16.51620
1998 0.33660 12.32370 1.54931 3.80000 50.52593
1999 0.40569 13.37870 1.07131 1.33000 13.75165
2000 0.39189 14.43269 1.15571 2.00000 13.74153
2001 0.25966 15.05927 1.07839 2.25000 14.47317
2002 0.23345 15.67927 1.12279 1.00000 8.18441
2003 0.27860 16.29927 1.16719 4.50000 9.36582
           
  These are the variables for the equation
  T = E(Y2).P(Y1)      

Table 4B: SUMMARY INPUT AND OUTPUT
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T             E-PREDICT     P-PREDICT      T           E.P
0.02412       15.103759       1.37073            0.02412     20.70318
0.03462       14.963231       3.1568118        0.03462     47.2361
0.06937       14.144091       4.840355          0.06937     68.46242
0.08148       13.599148       6.2465353        0.08148     84.94756
0.09782       13.420381       6.2504787        0.09782     83.88381
0.18141       12.227915       6.3490631        0.18141     77.6358
0.26874       11.989031       6.5106916        0.26874     78.05688
0.33084       11.81598         6.6389212        0.33084     78.44536
0.42507       10.624672       6.7201481        0.42507     71.39937
0.41946       10.621856       6.9084821        0.41946     73.3809
0.33660       10.619251       7.0715105        0.33660     75.09414
0.40569       10.61005         7.0924358        0.40569     75.2511
0.39189       9.7760004       7.1703154        0.39189     70.09701
0.25966       9.7124232       7.2904807        0.25966     70.80823
0.23345       9.6172235       7.304147          0.23345     70.24561
0.27860       9.4687832       8.7287513        0.27860     82.65065


The results showed that as the education levels interacted with the political system, there could be decreasing returns to scale of reduced government involvement.

6. Conclusion

Despite limits to this research of one case study, lack of data, the results clearly showed a major input into the economic and social development and hence the stages by which economic reform is introduced are education levels, in particular those of the female population. This has policy implications in terms of the importance of education policies and spending on the most vital ingredient to the success of policies which aim to modernize a nation.

There is an obvious need to extend this study across a number of nations as well as test the other equations in the model. As the database for nations becomes more developed this task will become easier.

References

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